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In 
The Supreme Gourt 
of the 
State of Utah 
GUST PAP ADO PULOS, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
·MARIO DEF ABRIZIO, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Appeal From the Third District Court of Utah, 
for Salt Lake County 
Honorable P. C. Evans, Judge 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
INTRODUCTORY S'fATEMENT 
Because appellant's brief conrmit~ errors of mis-
stated facts, the analysis of this casl-~ adopt,~d- by 
that brief "\\"ill not be followed. Instead~ we shall 
mttke our own, properly authenticat~d ~tatemrnt of 
facts proved and adopted by the trial court; then 
point out errors in the statements of fact by appel-
lant and indicate the results of such errorFi; then 
a.rgue the ease under our analysis of the problon1s 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
involved; and then answer briefly the points re .. 
maining which have been referred to by appellant 
in his brief. 
STATEME~NT OF FACTS 
This action is for damages for trespassing and for 
injunctive relief: against a eorntinuing trespass. It 
involves a S'ection of ground, namely, Section :Jl, 
Township 2 South, Range 2 West, lying on the east 
slope of the Oquirrh Mountain,s a :mile or two north 
of Copperton. The land is marginal land. It is on 
the fringe of the wheat land wh~ch . extends from 
the valley up into the mountains, and on the fringe 
of the grazing land which extends doV\rn from the 
mountain to the cultivated land in the valley. rrhe 
plaintiff and respondent is called Pappas. In 1935 
he leased ~ection 31 and other contiguous land fro1n 
I1. H. Gray, "rho wa~ a witness. (Exhibit A attach-
Pd to the complaint). Pappas 'vent into possession 
in 1935. He lambed his sheep in the spring of the 
year upon the level portion of tlH~ section close to 
the central "rater hole. His Rheep grazed the ~r(l­
tion until about June 15th, 'vhen they were moved 
to the ~ummer range. Thi ~ hP contiitued t0 do 
through 1936 and 1937 ( Tr. 70~ 71, 73). 
The defendant and appellant is called De fa. He 
'Nas a farmer. He had an idea that he coul<l ex-
tend the wheat belt farther V\rest into the l1ills, and 
'vith this in mind madP a lease w·ith Gray on April 
6. 19~R, for portion~ of ~rction ijl (Exhibil :f). 
Shortly after making thP- lease with Gray, Defa 
found that Grav djd not have title to Sretion 31. 
lie found that the County had become the O\vner hy 
tax deed. On Ma)''" 4, 1938, he lPaRed fron1 the 
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County a portion of the same land he had f.orn1erly 
leased from Gray, all within Section 31 (Exhibit 1; 
Tr. 109, 110, 121-123). 
Pappas, as he was 'vont to do, drove his flocks onto 
the land leased to him by Gray and found Defa in 
possession of substantially all of Section 31. 
Pappas learned from Defa that Gray no longer 
owned Section 31, """hereupon Pappas immediately 
went to Salt Lake County to secure a lease. Salt 
Lake County gave to Pappas a lease of some t'vo 
thousand acres, excluding Section 31 (Exhioit H; 
Tr. 90, 91, 156, 109-113). Pappas acknowledged his 
landlord Gray had no title to Section 31, and re-
cognized Defa 's lease with Salt Lake County for 
the section, and did in no way interfere with De-
fa's harvesting of his crop unde·r his lease with 
Salt Lake County f.or 1938. The harvest was not 
completed until in 1939 ('Tr. 73, 75-77, 112-113). 
Pappas obtained a lease from Salt Lake County of 
Section 31 and contiguous sections for the next 
year, 1939. (Exhibit E). The Defa lease expired 
May 4, 1939, and the Pappas lease commenced May 
4, 1939. 
Defa and Papp;as now knew that Gray had lost 
his title. Pappas was out of possession for 1938, 
and Defa was in possession. Pappas thereupon 
notified Gray that he would pay no more rent and 
had leased the land f~om the County (Tr. 137; Ex-
hibit K, Exhibits H and E; Tr. 140, 142-143, 157, 
138). 
Tn 1939 Pappas went into possession of Section 31 
nnder the terms of his lease with Salt Lake County 
(Exhibit E). He has remained in possession fro1n 
that time until the commencement of this action 
(Tr. 73, 75, 94, 80, 86, 158, 159, and Exhibit I). De-
fa 'va~ unable to renew his lease with Salt Lake 
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County, "'hich expired 1\iay 4, 1939. He then fell 
back upon his earlier lease with L. H. Gray. This 
he sets forth in his answer and amended answer 
(Tr. 21, 20, 27). In reliance upon Gray's title which 
Defa had repudiated, he began to plow and plant 
,Section 31 in 1940 (Tr. 78, 79, 82, 113, 119, 159). It 
is the trespass of plo"\\ri.ng up the feed for Pappas's 
flock with the loss of grazing and damage to his 
sheep of which the respondent complains. No ques-
tion is raised by appellant as to respondent's right 
to an injunction if it he assumed that the trespass 
by appellant is established. 
ERRONEOUS STATEMENTS IN APPEL-
LANT'S BRIEF. . 
Respondent duly moved this Court to diminish thr. 
record in these proceedings hy striking all refer-
~ence to a certain deed called Exhibit 1, which was 
an auditor's deed given by Salt Lake County, and 
which motion was granted. Because of the repeat-
ed reference to this instrument (Br. 6, 7, 16, 17, 
28, 29) and its legal effect upon these proc~edings 
as well as frequent and numerous state1nents not 
supported by the record, appellant~s brief in largf:l 
part must he disregarded in considering the orderly 
presentation of the points of law involved. 
According to the statement of appellant's counsel 
the striking of Exhibit 1, the deed from Salt Lake 
·county, cost appellant his case, because his brief 
at page 6 stated: "That is the eontrolbng undis-
puted fact in this case. And upon that fact, and 
upon that undisputed record, the 'vhole case 
tnrns. '' 
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Statements in appellant's brief not supported by 
the record are: 
Page 4, lines 9, 10, 11: 
Respondent did not claim as a tenant of L. li. 
Gray except for the years 1935, 1936: 1g37 
(see Para. 2 of Complaint). From 1938 to 
1941 he claimed as a tenant of Salt Lake 
County only (Complaint, Para. 5, 6, 7; Tr. 2, 
3, also Tr. 137, 138, 140, 142-143, 157). 
Page 4, lines 22-29: 
Plaintiff and defendant met on Section 31 in 
April, not on ~:lay 4, 1938 ('l~r. 111, 159). Mr. 
Rushton talked to appellant, not to both par-
ties (Tr. 121, 122). 
Page 4, lines 30-36, Page 5, lines 1-5: 
There is no evidence that the parties went to 
the courthouse together or were there at the 
same time, and no evidence that anything was 
done ''by mutual consent and agreement.'!' 
(See Tr. 91-92, 110-1121 121, 156-157). 
Page 6, lines 19-34, all of Page 7 except bottom 
four lines: 
All this relates to the exhibit which was stricken 
and m-qst be disregarded. 
Page 7, last four lines: 
There is no evidence that defendant (arpel-
lant) was in possession after harvesting the 
crop in 1939 until plowing was done in 1940. 
Page 16, lines 5-9: 
There is no support for this sentence. The 
parties learned that the County had taken the 
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land for taxes, but neither volunteered any-
thing for L. H. Gray. 
Page 16, line 20 to P'age 17, line 5: 
This relates to the stricken exhibit and must 
be disregarded. 
Page 2:1, line 7 : 
The landlords L. H. Gray and Western Land 
A.ssociation did not have the record title; (see 
Exhibits A, B, C, D). 
Page 25, bottom paragraph: 
The brief cites no reference to evidence of 
appellant's possession or to any admissions. 
The statement must be disregarded. 
Page 27, bottom four lines: 
There is no evidence that respondent was on 
Section 31 on ~lay 4, 1938. 
Page 28, lines 5-12: 
No .evidence suppotrts their statement r.:bo~ut 
appellant and respondent going to the county 
commissioners together or taking any mutual 
joint or agreed action in procuri11£' lea~es. 
Each acted alone, for his best inter~st~, nnd 
without regard to the other (l'r. Jl, 110, 121-
123, 125, 156-1f>S). 
Page 28, lines 13-21: 
This relates to the stricken exhibit and must be 
disregarded. 
With the~se erroneous statements and reference~ 
out of the brief the arguments ·under assig1nnents 
numbered I, IV and V faJl because their support is 
takPn a'vay. These arguments must he disregarded 
lJv the Court. AsRi!!nPd error No. III ~q frivolons 
aiid will be di"rega~ded. Assigned errors II, VI 
and VII will be dealt with subsequently. 
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POINTS IN\70LVJ1JD 
Because appellant's brief is confusing with its 
erroneous statements it will not be answered in the 
order of its points. 
This appeal raises four questions, or four legal 
propositions 'vhich are stated from the point of 
vie'v adopted by the trial court: 
1. During all times here material plain-
tiff and respondent had the right to pos-
session of Section 31. 
2. Defendant and appellant trespassed 
upon Section 31 in 1940. 
3. Respondent is not estopped to assert 
the County's title. 
4. The award of $425.00 damages was 
proper. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
DURING ALL TIMES HERE MATERIAL 
PijAINTIFF AND RESPO·NDENT HAD 
THE RIGHT TO POSSE·SSION OF SEC-
TION 31. 
Paragraph 9. of the complaint and finding No. X 
( Tr. 4, 32) allege and find a trespass by app·ellan t 
on Section 31 of the land leased by respondent from 
Salt Lake County, which lease included all of Sec-
tion 31, except the South half of the Southeast 
Quarter (Exhibit 11J). The judgment of the court 
enjoined appellant from interfering with the re-
~pondent 's possession of Section 31, and the whole 
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thereof, except the South half of the Southeast 
Quarter (Tr. 35). Exhibits A, B, and C show that 
this land was formerly O\vned by George H. Dorton 
and the Western Land Association, and was con-
veyed by auditor's deed to Salt Lake County on 
~!arch 31st and April lOth, 1936. Exhibit 1 shows 
the lease of this land to appellant for one year frorn 
May 4, 1938. Exhibit E shows the lease of this 
land by Salt Lake County to the respondent for one 
year from June 14, 1939, \vhich lease was extended 
to June 15, 1941, by act of the Board of County 
Commissioners of Salt Lake County (E~hibit F). 
It is true that appellant's lessor, \Vestern Land 
-~ssociation acquired the property from Salt Lake 
County on December 6, 1940 (Exhibit D). But this 
deed was made subject to existing leases or agree-
Inents made by Sa1t Jjake County, which would in-
clude the lease referred to as Exhibit E. 
J~~espondent thns establishes ownership of the land 
by his lessor through tax sale and a lease to hi1n, 
\vhich is sufficient title, unless attacked, under 
R. S. lJ. 1933, 80-10-35, as Amended in 1939. 
~t\.ppellant offered no evidence attacking this taY 
title and the lease to respondent. On the contrary 
appellant recognized this title in Salt Lake County 
by leasing this very land from the County in 1938, 
(Exhibit 1), and appellant's lessor recognized this 
paramount title by purchasing the property along 
with other property in 1940. (Exhibit D). Thus 
all parties have recognized the County's title to 
the land, and the County leased to respondent and 
none other for the period from June 14, 1939, to 
June 15, 1941, which includes all of the periods per-
tinent to this controversy·. 
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II. 
DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT TRESPASS .. 
ED UPON SECTION 31 IN 1940. 
Respondent took possession of Section 31 in the 
~pring of 1939 and protected appellant's crop by 
hiring two extra sheep herders (Tr. 73, 75 ). He 
continued in possession by grazing Section 31 in 
the fall of 1939 (Tr. 94) and the spring· of 1940 (Tr. 
73, 80, 86, 103, 105, 154, 158-159; Exhibit I). Re-
spondent was on the land in ~1ay: 1940, when appel-
lant or his boys commenced plowing and gradually 
drove respondent's sheep off of Section 31 and 
away from the water hole (Tr. 78, 79, 83). 
It is plain that respondent had the right of posses .. 
sion and pos·session in :'Jfay, 1940, when appellant 
came to Sectiton 31 and plowed. Either possession 
or right of possession is enough to support an action 
of tre~pass to real property. 
26 Ruling Case Law 955-960. 
Cases Cited at 4th Decennial Digest, Vol. 
29, Trespass, Sers. 20 ( ·~) ~ 20 ( 3), 20 
( 4). 
III. 
RESPONDENT IS NOT ESTOPPED TO 
ASSERT THE COUNTY'S 'TITLE. 
At page 15, appellant's brief states that the com-
plaint was demurrable under R. S. U. 1933, 104-2-14, 
and Woodbury v. Bunker, Steele et al, 98 Utah 216. 
The rase is considered infra. The statute simply 
P~tabli~hes a statntory presumption which can be 
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overcome by evidence. ~~or a somewhat similar 
statutory interpretation see 
Jackson v. James, g7 Utah 41, 46; 89 l)ac. 
(2d) 235. . 
And the cornplaint overcame the presumption by 
alleging loss of the property and dispossession un-
der plaintiff's landlord with a suhs~quent lease 
from Salt Lake County, under which he went into 
possession (Complaint, para. 4, 7 ; Tr. 2, 3). The 
complaint was therefore not demurrable but thP 
question of estoppel under the evidence is one 
which requires attention. 
It is true that ap.p·ellant and respondent leased 
from the same landlord, L. H. Gray (indeed they 
leased from another common landlord, Salt Lake 
County). Respondent had possession,. claiming 
under L. H. Gray, during the years 1935, 1936 and 
1937 ( Tr. 70, 137), but lost the land on April 24, 
1938, because of a paramount title in Salt Lake 
County (Exhibit 1; Tr. 73, 75, 110, 112). Appel-
lant planted and harvested a crop in 1938 and 19~9. 
Appellant knew that respondent wa.s out of posses-
sion then, but so did L. H. Gray, the· alter e~o { T!·. 
1 36) of the vVestern T_jand Association (Tr. 137, 
188, 140, 142, 143, 157; Exhibit K)~ To defeat the 
estoppel respondent relies upon the fact that he 
lost possession becauEt€ of a title para1nount to his 
landlord (see Exhibit A). advised his landlord of 
this, advised his landlord that he was leasing from 
the paramount title holder, and repudiated the 
lease from L. H. Gray· and as to part of the land, 
' . that he is not denying his landlord's title but I~ 
simply asserting that title which was transferred 
to Salt IJake County. 
As appears from Exhibit A, attached to the com-
plaint, plaintiff 'vas under obligation to L. H. Gray 
to pay a yearly rental for a portion of Section 31, 
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w·hich is the property defendant has trespa~~Pd 
upon. Under the terms of said lease ''failing to 
1nake said payments, the lease stands terminated 
vvithout further notice.'' When defendant Defa 
told plaintiff Pappas in April, 1938, "'hile stand-
ing upon the land in question, that L. H. Gra.y no 
longer had any right to lease Section 31 but that 
he, Defa, had a lease from Salt Lake County, plain-
tiff went to Salt Lake County to verify this state-
ment (Tr. 91, 110, 121, 156-157). Upon learning 
that the records of the County Reeorder 's office of 
Salt !Jake County showed that ~A.uditor 's Tax 
Deeds to most of Section 31, including all of the 
land here in q uesiion, had been iss nect to Salt Lake 
County in 1936, which deeds were introduced in 
evidence as Exhibits A, B, and C, plaintiff Pappas 
went to see I1. H. Gray. Pappas then offered to 
lease from L. H. Gray a certain Section 3 which 
had not been sold for taxes and tn pay a -p.roporti0n 
of rent for said sertion. This, Gray refused to do 
and Pappas refused to pay further rent upon said 
lease to I.J. H. Gray (Tr. 139-142, 157). Pappas 
had leased other sections than Section 31 for 1938 
from Salt !Jake County 'vhich appears in evidence 
fron1 Exhibit H. In the san1e year defendant Defa 
leased from Salt T.Jake County ,for one year com-
Jnencing on the 4th day of May1 1938, portions of 
Section 31 (Exhibit 1). Plaintiff did not retake 
posRession until May, 1939. 
The legal effect of these circumstances a.nd con-
tract was to terminate the relationship of landlord 
and tenant between Pappas and Gray. In the caRe 
of Woodbury v. Bunker, 98 Utah 216, the Court 
considers a question not similar but analogous to 
the problem at hand. In that case the question 
arose whether or not a tenant may, consistent with 
the forcible entry and detainer statutes, claim pos-
R(l~!"!ion under a ~11 hr;:eqnent purchaser of the tax 
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title without prior notice to and without first ter-
minating occupancy and possession under his 
original lessor. By the converse rule the plain-
tiff herein, having given his former landlord 
notice and having refused to pay further rent and 
having been ousted from possession by a lessee of 
the owner of the land in 1938, may thereafter lease 
said land from the legal owner of the property, and 
assert his lease against the former lessor or par .. 
ties in privity with said lessor. 
The application of the Woodbury case to the sit-
uation of the app·ellant herein would prevent him 
from claiming to be a lessee of Salt Lake County, 
he-cause he leased frlQm the County while in pos-
~ession under Gray and without termination of ten-
ancy, loss of possession, or notice to. Gray. The 
appellant recognized the County's title by leasing 
from it in 1938, and Gray recognized that ·title by 
purchasing from the County in 1940 (Exhibit D), 
which purchase was made subject to respondent's 
lease. Respondent claims under the County's title 
""hich has not been questionPd in this casr, and 
v:hich indeed has been recognized by both the ap-
pellant and- Gray; and although the apr;ellant re-
cognizes the C1ounty's title, he is estopped to assert 
it as in conflict with Gray's title under Woodbury 
v. Bunker. 
In furth~e~ support of this position numerous cases 
have been decided by many jurisdictions supporting 
. the general proposition "\vhich is well stated in the 
ease of 
Jenkinson v. \Vinans (M~ehL (;7 ·~. '\V. 
549 at Page 550 : 
"Though the tenant cannot sho,v that the 
lPs~or had no title to the pre~mises when the 
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tenancy commenced, he may sho"\v that the 
lands haYe been sold at tax sales, and the 
landlord's title thereby extinguished. The 
estoppel extends only to the title \Vhich 
the landlord had at the time of leasing. If 
that title has been extinguished, it may be 
shown; for then the landlord has no right 
to the possession. As was said in 1\fc-
Guffie v. Carter, 42 Mich. 497, 4 N. W. 211, 
'The rule is fanlilia,r that both tenant and 
those in privity, either in blood or estate, 
are estoppea from disputing the title of the 
landlord, or the title of anyone' who suc-
ceeds to his rights, so long as they hold the 
possession originally derived from him. 
But this principle does nqt forbid the ten-
ant from showing that the landlord's title 
has expired, or has been extinguished by 
his o"\\·u act or operation of law,)_. citing 
Lamson v Clarkson, ] 13 '}\[ass. 348; Fuller 
v. Sweet, 30 Mich. 2'37; Hilbourn v. Fogg, 
99 Mass. 11; D~sp1ard .v. \V alhrid!ge, 15 
N.Y. 374~ Mountnoy v. Collier, 1 El. & Bl. 
630, 16 Eng. Law & Eq. 232. '' 
'rltis case arose in Michigan under a set of facts 
very similar to the case at bar. The plaintiff 'vho 
had lost the land on ta.x sale, 'vas atten1pting to 
onf-t the defendant who had leased the land from 
1l new owner under tax sale. The defendant had 
hren ousted by the purchase-r under tax sale and 
had then agreed with the ne'v owner for a lease of 
the pr10perty. As above indicated, the Court held 
th:1t the defendant could deny his former landlord's 
~.i t.l e under such cirflnmstances . 
To the same effect see the case of 
Bo"rman v. Goodrich, (Neb.) 144 N.W. 
240: 
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Hartzog v. Seeger. Coal Co (Tex.) 163 S. W 
1055 at 1059. 
De:B~orest v. vV alters (N .. Y.) 47 N. E. 294 
at 297. 
_1.\nnrotation: '' It is accordingly a \\ell eci-
tablished rule forming an exception to 
or limitation upon the general operation 
of the rule that a tenant is estopped to 
deny his landlord's title, that the tenant 
may show that, since the beginning of his 
tenancy, the title or interest of the land-
lord has passed to a third person." 
38 L.R.A. (NS) 863. 
It is, therefore, evident that Defa having leased the 
section in 1938 from Salt Lake County could .not 
thereafter deny Salt Lake County's title, anu that 
Papp~as p·roperly terminated his lease with L.II.Ur~ly 
\vhose title e-xpired, and properly enteTed into a 
lease '\\rith Salt I.~akP County for Section 31. in 1939 
and 1940, 'vhich lease continued to June 15, 1941. 
IV. 
THE A W ... t\RD OF $425.00 DAMAG.FJS \VA~ 
!)ROPER. 
Appellant assails the judgment for dan1ages at 
page 29 of his brief simply by stating his opinion 
that damages for loss of lambs and gra~ing were 
not' proper under the complaint. The eYidence 
eited at pages 29-33 has nothing to do \\'"ith this 
1uestion. 
lTnder plaintiff's lease fron1 Salt Lake County the 
plaintiff was entitled to the possession of SPct!on 
31, excepting only t\vo forty-acre tracts along the 
s:outh line of the east half of the S'ection. l,l viola· 
tion of plaintiff's posRession, defendant caine upon 
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the lanJ in 1~40 and plo\ved up approxin1aLely three 
hundred acres of the best feed "I thin the section. 
A.ll of the rented portion of the section \Yas de-
stroyed for feed, with the exception of the gullies 
covered \vith heavy brush. 'l'he central \vateting 
hole for all of plaintiff's grazing land is locatt~d 
in the middle of this section ('1'1'. 71). rrhe best 
lambing gTound available in all of phuntiff 's leased 
ground is located upon thi~ section, and all of the 
fiat portions which have been (•leared and are with-
out brush and especially used by the plaintiff for 
lambing, have been plowed hy the defendant. 
( Tr. 82, 84-85) . 
The complaint· (Tr. 1-9) plainly allegeR in para-
graph 9, loss of use of the land in Section 31 for 
grazing, and the prayer fixes the damage for this 
ttem at $175.00. This damage i8 for loss of feed, 
and could be shown in either of two obvious ways: 
(a) by sho,ving what feed \vas lost and fixing its 
1narket value, or (h) by «sho"~in!?.· the tnarket val uP 
- . 
of land required to replace tl1e lost feed. (See Tr. 
~1) o The plaintiff te~ti:fied at 1'ranscript 87 that 
the rented land 'va~ not as Q'ood as Section 31 which 
it wa~ to supplant .. and that tlte feed fro1n Sec-tion 
Rl was worth more than the feed which he_,got from 
the extra rented land 0 ThiR ~fiR(\ therefore. see1n~ 
to come \\"'ell within the men~.1.1re of da.Tnag€s used 
0 tn 
Anderson Vo .J P-n~Pn, 71 lTtah 29!1; 
referred to hereinafter. R~e also -, 
'Villiston, RevisPd ~Clition, Sections 1354 
and 1384. 
The rule iR statPrl at 
15 Am .• Jur. r1~9, aR follo'v~: 
"It has been held, more-over, that if th0 
property is ~nrl1 thnt it rannot hP rPpla(·r·(l.. 
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the measure of damages is th~~ amou11t such 
property is ordinarily \Vorth for use. If it 
can be replaced, however, the da1nages are 
the cost of hiring the property \rhich the 
owner is forced to substitute for it.)' 
The she~ep of the plaintiff a.t lan1bing time "\Vere cmn~ 
pelled to seek higher ground where feed was avail-
able. This made it necessary for ewes to leave their 
lambs some considerable distance in order to ob-
tain water. It was physically impossible fur the 
plaintiff to prevent ewes from losing their la.n1bs, 
a.nd, as a result, plaintiff has been ila.ntaged to the 
extent of $250.00 for loss of and damage to his 
herd. 
It is admitted that thP gene-ral rule is that, findings 
of fact outside the issues rais(;J by the pleadings 
cannot be given effect by the Appellate Court; hut 
the question here is whether this general rul~3 has 
any application to this case. In the first plaee, th/} 
finding is supported b~ the allegations o ~ special 
damage in the complaint; secondly, evidence of loss 
of lambs was adrnissible as an element of general 
damages ; and, in the third place, since no objection 
\vas made to the introduction of evidenee on thig 
issue, the case falls \vithin a \vell recognized ex-
ception to the general rule stated. 
The finding in question is 10 (a) : 
'' (a) That on or about May 20, 1940, to 
and including June 11 1940, defendant 
plo,ved a portion of the above described 
property, being more particularly a portion 
in that part of Section 31 which was leased 
by the plaintiff from Salt Lake County un-
der date of tT une 14, 1939, and which 
land was heretofore used primarily for 
lambing and constituted the best lambing 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
17 
ground of the plaintiff. That said ground 
"·as in the in11nediate proximity of "'ater 
for ewes that w·ere la1nbing and enabled 
e"Tes to reach the "·ater 'vith their lamLs. 
That by reason of said plo,ving of said por-
tions of said s·ection, the use of said prop-
erty for grazing and lambing of plaintiff's 
sheep and for the watering of plaintiff's 
sheep during lambing was destroyed so 
that plRintiff was compelled to larnb hi~ 
flocks upon undesirable land ren1ote from 
said watering hole thereby causing thP. loss 
of approximately fifty lambs, to :ola.i.ntiff's 
damage and preventing the use of sai<i 
property heretofore required for grazing· 
purposes by the plaintiff.'~ 
It is true that the finding is more explicit than the 
complaint as to the manner in which defendant's 
trespass damaged plaintiff in reference to use of 
the land for purposes of lambing. The complaint 
alleged in paragraph 3 that the land described ''is 
useful to plaintiff for the grazing, shearing and 
lambing of sheep,'' and in paragraph 8 that ''on or 
about April 25, 1940, plaintiff drove his 2,000 head 
of sheep on said property for the purpose of graz-
ing, shearing and lambing said sheep.'' An jn i~ar­
agra.ph 9 (a) that defendant"s plowing of the land 
destroyed ,''the use of the property for grazin.~ ol' 
for shearing of plaintiff's sheep thereby causing 
damage to plaintiff;'' and in paragraph 9 (b) that 
defendant's plowing rendered 
'' R·aid propertv bv virtue of the destruction 
of feed and the ouster of possession of 1iLtle 
,.,.alue for the purposes of grazing, shear-
ing' and la.mbjng- plaintiff's sheep and ren-
derin~ all of the prop·erty described in par-
ng-T~a:ph 6 of Ht.tlP value, thP ROO acres ".,.l:ir'h 
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was plowed being the most valuhble f;raz-
ing land of all of the said tracts, without the 
use of which the property under lease could 
not and cannot support plaintiff's sheep 
during lambing and shearing time ; '' 
and in the p~rayer the plaintiff indicates thr 8peeifie 
relief desired and the kind of case the plaintiff sup-
poses he has made by the use of the follo".,.h!g \vorda: 
''. . . plaintiff prays judgment . . . for 
ds.mages ~uffered . . through plowing 
of land . . . ror loss of grazing ... and 
for damage to sheep and loss of lambs.'' 
See Bancroft's Code Pleading, S-ection 12. 
It plainly app.ears that plaintiff has alleged damage 
for the loss of the use of the alleged property for 
grazing, and sp~ecial damage to sheep and loss. of 
lambs, which is an incident of the loss of grazing. 
But if it be assumed that the darnage was not 
specially p~eaded, the judgment is still. supportable. 
A valuable precedent on this question is 
Anderson, et a.l. v. Jensen, et al., 71 ·utah 
295: 265 Pac. 745. · · 
This was also a case involving treBpass t0 land 
'vhich wa.s valuable for grazing and lan1bing sheep, 
l?ut the tresp~ass in that case was by sheep rather 
than by plowing the land. It appears that plaintiff 
0\Vned ]and along the bottom near a creek which 
".,.as ~heltered and therefore valuable for laml·ing 
ground; whereas the defendant'~ property was 
higher up and not so valuable for lambing. De· 
fendant permitted hi~ shElep tn g;raze a portion of 
the lamhine: Q'rouno, nsin!!' it a1R0 for the purpoRe 
of lamhing; thereby keeping plaintiff's ~heep off 
because of the danger of getting the la1nbs of the 
t'vo p::t rtieR mi-xed np. The complaint sought ilanl-
ages for loss of URP of the land both for gra~ing 
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and for lan1bing and al-so sought an injunction 
against continued trespass. The evidence sho,ved 
that the land was valuable for grazing and that i~; 
had a separate value as lambing ground. 'l'he 
Court referred to this as follows : 
"The evidence tends to show that plain-
tiffs' land along Sheep Creek is especially 
desirable for lan1bing sheep because it is 
\rarm, comparatively level, and protected 
fro1n the spring winds and storms. It is 
also made to appear that it is a distinct 
advantage to have sheep, while lambing, 
near water becaus-e if the ewes are com-
pelled to travel any considerable distance 
to secure water there is danger of the 
young lambs being lost from their mothers.'' 
Defendant took the p·osition that plaintiff's dam .. 
age could he measured only by the value of the for-
age eaten and destroyed by def~enda.nt 's sheep and 
also contended "that proof affecting any en .. 
hanced rental value of the land in question because 
of its adaptability for lan1bing sheep is in the 
nature of special damages and must be specially 
pleaded to admit proof thereof.'' In rejecting this 
contention of defendant, the Court made the follow· 
i ng holding: 
''In determining such reasonable rental 
value, the fact tha.t the land may be valu-
able for lambing purposes is as proper a 
n1atter of inquiry as is the fact that the 
land may be valuable for grazing1 purposes. 
The ultimate fact to he determined is the 
reasonable rental value of the land, and 
any fact which aids in determining such 
n1t1mate faet is proper evidence under thP 
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general issue of damages and need not be 
specially pleaded.'' 
It thus appears that the value of the land for lamb-
ing. "\Vas separate and apart from the value of the 
land for grazing and that this separate value was 
not an element of sp~ecial damage which required 
specific pleading. 
A somewhat similar case is 
Drinkh!ouse v. Van Ness, 202 Cal. 359 ; 260 
Pac. 869, 
'.vhich was an action in replevin for a race horse, 
the plaintiff claliming $10,000.00 damage for the 
value at the time of taking and $10,000.00 damage 
for loss of us.e during the detention. Over defend-
ant's strenuous objection evidence was received as 
to the value of the horse as a racing pony and also 
as to its value for breeding purposes both because 
of the races it had won and the races its colts had 
won ; and evidence was further received over ob-
jection as t10 the horse's earnings as a stud horse 
during the period of detention. The defendant o~ 
jected that plaintiff was attempting to prove spe .. 
cial damag'es under an allegation of general dam .. 
a.g1e and on appeal objected to the finding of these 
special damages a.s not supported by the issues of 
the complaint. The Court held, however,. that the 
value of the horse at tl1e time of the taking included 
its value for all purposes and that it was therefore 
proper to show its value for breeding purposes as 
a stud horse. 
There is no showing here that the appellant was 
surprised, misled or prejudiced by the introduc-
tion of p-roof as to loss of lambs. In 
Moyle v. McKean, 49 Utah 93, at Page 99; 
162 Pac. 63, 
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where a similar ground for reversal \\~as urged upon 
the Court, the Court said: 
''It is also insisted that a certain finding 
'is not "rithin the allegations of the com-
plaint.' \·rhile it is true that there are no 
allegations in the complaint in the precise 
form of the finding, yet the finding is fair-
ly ";ithin the purvie"r of the allegations ~of 
the complaint and is responsive, thereto. 
That assignment must therefore also fail.'' 
Here the prayer of the complaint plainly advised 
the defendant of the nature of the case pJaintiff 
was attempting to make. The pr·ayer asked for 
"$175.00 for loss of grazing and $250.00 for dam-
age to sheep and loss of lambs.'' It is held in 
~fcPheete-rs v. 1\IcMahon, 131 Cal. App. 418; 
21 Pac. ( 2d) 606, 
that in determining whether reversible error was 
committed in the introduction of evidence outside 
the pleadings the prayer may be consulted to de-
termine the nature of the case which plaintiff In-
tended to make. ..A.nd in 
Neel v. Ramelli, 138 Cal. App. 366; 32 Pac. 
(2d) 177, 
0vidence was introduced on a question of adverse 
posses·sion upon which findings of fact were made 
although not pleaded in the complaint. In uphold-
ing the lower court's judgment the Court of 
Appeals suggested that the general allegations of 
the complaint were sufficient to raise the issue and 
\vent on to say: 
•'hut, if not, the appellant Waf.; not pre-
judiced because he was fully· appri sril. o I' 
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the issues to be tried and was given ample 
opportunity to present his defense.'' 
And it likewise app·e~ars here that defendant was 
fully advis.ed of the issues of the ease and of a 
claimed element of damage for loss of land. An 
argument that a technical defect e:xisted in ~ com-
~Jlaint should not be favored by this Court since it 
is not in the interest of justice and is an encourage-
ment to obstructive tactics in litigation. 
R. S. U. 1933, 104-13-1; 104-14-1. 
But assuming for the sake of argument only that 
the finding referred to was not within the issues oJ 
.the complaint, the finding is still supportable in 
this Court. The plaintiff testified as to the loss 
of lambs beeause of defendant's trespass (Tr. 83-
85). Defendant made no objection to this testi· 
mony except to the testimony as to the price for 
which lambs were sold, and as to this his only ob-
jection was, ''I object to that unless you fix the 
time.'' And to Steve ~Iartinez' testimony as to 
]oss of lambs at Page 105 of the transcript no ob--
jection whatever was interposed. 
It is well established that where no objection is made 
to the introduction of evidence ,vhich is outside 
the specific issues of the pleadings, the court may 
make findings on such issues, which findings will 
be upheld by the Appellate Court. 
Stephens v. Doxey, 62 Utah 241; 218 Pac. 
965. 
Salt Lake Investment Co. v. Fox, 37 Utah 
334, 238; 108 Pac. 11:~2. 
Houtz v. Union Pacific, 33 Utah 175, 19j; 
93 Pac. 439; 17 r~.R.A. (N .. S.) 628. 
Kaiser v. l{aiser, 106 Cal. App. 6GS; 289 
Pac. 875, 876. 
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Crescent Lun1ber Co. Y. Lars·on, 166 Cal. 
168; 135 l~a.c. 502. 
Smith v. Golden State Syndicate, 43 Cal. 
App. 346; 185 Pac. 209, 210. 
Stark,veather v. Eddy, 87 l~al. Ap·p. 92; 
261 Pac. 7 63. 
McDougal v. Hulet, 132 Cat 154; 64 Pa.c. 
278. 
Conlon v. Northern Life Ins. Co., 108 
~font. 473; 92 Pac. (2d) 284. 
Hansen v. Standard Oil Co. of Calif·oTnia, 
55 Idaho 483; 44 P'ac. (2d) 709, 714. 
North Electric Mfg. Co. v. Shelley, 32 Ohio 
App. 379; 168 N. E. 216. 
Shelley v. Board of Trade, 87 Cal. App. 
344; 262 Pac. 403. 
In Stephens v. Doxey, supra, the appellant coin-
-plained that a finding eovered a different strip of 
ground than that alleged. The Court said at Page 
249 of 62 Utah: 
''This is assigned as error on the ground 
that the change was not pleaded, and, there-
fore, not made an issue. It is not claimed 
the finding is ,,rj thout evidence to support 
it, or that such evidence was objected to 
by defendant. The assignment is without 
n1Pri t.'' 
fn Kaiser v. Kaiser, supra, 'vhich was an a.ction for 
nreounting on a farm leased by defendant to the 
plaintiff the defendant app·ealed partly on the 
g-flound that some findings were made on matters 
11ot pleaded. As to this, the California Court said: 
"Appellant contends that there is a fatal 
v~rianrr between the allegations of the 
romnlaint. and the evidenrP, and that Rome 
of the findings hased on tl1at evidence RrP 
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outside the issues. Such evidence, however, 
was admitted without objection, ~and the de-
fendant introduced evidence bearing upon 
all the ultimate facts found by the court. 
It may fairly be stated, therefore, that the 
case was tried on the theory that such facts 
we~re in issue, and neither party was mis-
led to his prejudice.'' 
In (~rescent Lumber Co v. La,rson, supra, the Court 
quoted the_ general rule that a finding entirely out .. 
side of the issues must be disregarded and then 
noted the £ollowing exception to this rule : 
'' Th!e rule just stated is subject to the 
qualification that a finding may be con-
sidered where the issue though not formal-
ly raised by the pleadings, was tried in the 
court below without objection. Ill. T. & S. 
Bank v. Pac. Ry. Co., 115 Cal. .285, 47 Pac. 
60; Sprigg v. Barber, 122 Cal, 573, 55 Pac. 
419." 
And in Stark,veather v. Eddy, supra, at Pa.ge 765 
of 261 Pacific, the Court said : 
''It has been frequently held that, where 
a cause is tried upon the theory that cer-
tain facts are in issue, after judgn1ent the 
cause will be considereii a.s though such 
i ~sues 'vere correctly tendered by the 
pleading.'' 
The test of prejudicial error should be whether the 
party complaining was misled or prejudiced. As 
said in 
Mankin v. Southwestern Automobile Insur-
ance Company, '113 Cal. A.pp. 243 ; 298 
J>ac. 4-2 at 43: 
''Strictly. speaking, the complaint should 
have alleged surh 'vaiver before the evidence 
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to conform "·ith the proof. It 8een1s very 
clear, however, that the irregularity of vro--
cedure in failing· to make such ruuendn1en t 
to the complaint has not resulted in any 
miscarriage of justice.'' 
And in 
Dudley v. Peterson, 42 Arizona 282; 25 
Pac. (2d) 276 at 278, 
the Court held that although pleadings should ha:ve 
been amended to conform to the evidence at the 
time evidence 'vas introduced, it was not reversible 
error and the case would not be remanded where it 
was plain that the pleading would be amended and 
the same evidence would be offered on a new trial. 
Appellant may remonstrate that he rnade son1e ob .. 
jection to introduction of this evidence, even though 
not the right objection or at the right time. (See 
Tr. 85). This argun1ent is definite~ly rejected by 
Geanakoules v. Union Portland Ce1nent 
Company, 41 Utah 486, at Pagie 489; 
126 Pac. 329. 
APPELLANT'S POINTS 
ALJ.JEGATIONS OF ANSWER ADMITTED BY 
FAILURE TO REPLY 
Appellant raises one or two questions which have 
not been answered. At pages 8 and 21 of his brief 
appellant suggests that the allegations of the an-
swer we~re admitted by our failure to reply, citing 
it S. U. 104-11-2 and 104-13-11. These statutes, 
u.pplied to the pleadings, are sufficient and"\\ter to 
appellant. The answer was not a connterclain1 be-
cause it asked for nothing. It alleged lease~ to the 
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appellant from L. H. Gray and from Salt Lake 
County (Tr. 20, 27), which were but a denial, in 
tffect, of the contplaint. No reply to this was re. 
quired because the answer merely controverts the 
complaint and the only reply that would have been 
n1ade on the facts is a reiteration of the con1plaint 
(See Bancroft, Code Pleading, Se~c. 2192 and the 
ca.se there cited, 
Tate v. Rose, 35 Utah 229; 99 Pac. 1003). 
Furthermore, the failure to reply, if neocessary, was 
waived by ap·p~ellant 's g10ing to trial on the merits. 
Allen v. Schultz, (Wash.), 181 Pac. 916, 
918; 6 A.L.R. 676. 
Hardin's Committee v. Shehnan, 245 Ky. 
508; 53 s. w. (2d) 923. 
Von Eime v. Fuchs, 320 1\tio. 746; 8 S. W. 
(2'd) 824. 
Cochran v. Cochran, 133 Wash. 415 ; 233 
P~ac. 918. 
Jenkins v. Spedden, 136 1\!Id. 637; 111 At. 
136. 
FAILURE TO MAKE FINDINGS O·N MATE· 
RIAL FACTS RAISED BY APPELLANT. 
Appellant's brief con1plains of the court's failure 
to make findings on the lease from L. H. Gray to 
appellant (p. 21); and on possession of Section 31 
( p. 25) ; als1o of finding No. IV said to be ''not sup· 
ported by any evidence whatever. It is contrary 
to the undisputed and record evidence." (Br. 27). 
It was :unnecessary to make a finding as to Exhibit 
3. Finding No. IV (Tr. 30) finds that Salt Lake 
Countv on and after April 24, 1938, was the owner 
of Section 31. That obvjates a finding as to Ex-
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hibit 3 'vhich is of necessity 1nade abortive by the 
finding. 
As to the finding on possession, finding No. V 
definitely states that defendant went into lawful 
possession of Section 31 on or about ~lay 4, 1938, 
for one year, during 'Yhich tin1e respondent was out 
of possession. Finding No. VIII is supported by 
evidence, despite appellant's statement (Br. 25). 
The evidence establishes that respondent was in 
possession in 1939, placed extra n1en to protect the 
wheat, and permitted appellant to harvest his crop 
without molestation (Tr. 73, 75, 112, 113, 115, 158). 
Appellant romplains generally, but points out noth-
ing 'vhieh supports his complaining1. 
:\ppellant attacks finding No. IV as above quoted. 
The finding itself states the facts upon which it is 
based ( SeP Exhibits A, B, C). 
RIGHT TO H.._t\RVEST CR.Q·P 
At pages. 33 and 35 of his brief appellant states a 
rule that an agricultural tenant holds land for an 
additional year unless given notice to quit within 
~ixty days after his term expires. R. S. U. 104-60-4. 
Appellant's term expired ~{ay 4, 1939 (Exhibit 1, 
Finding V, Tr. 30). Respondent, successor to the 
landlord's estate, advised appellant of termination 
of appellant's lease by his presence on the land and 
hy word of mouth in May of 1939 (Tr. 73, 75, 158; 
Finding VIII). 
Even if it he assumed that appellant's term was ex-
trnded for a ~~ear to l\{ay 4, 1940, he cannot claim 
for the- additional year to May 4, 1941, because he 
"\Vrt~ ont of poRSP~sion (one of the statutory re-
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quirements) and he was a.gain notified to quit (Tr. 
78, 83, 113; Exhibit I). Appellant was therefore a 
trespasser when the wheat was planted in July ·or 
August, 1940 (Tr. 79, 114), .and had no claim on the 
crop. 
Mehl v. Norton (Minn.), 275 N. W. 843; 113 
A.L.R. 1055. 
Annotations at 39 A.L.R. 958; 57 A.L.R. 
584; 113 A.L.R. 1059; 95 A.L.R. 
1127; 18 Am. Jur. 220-224. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the district court is fully sup· 
ported by all the evidence in this case and by the 
applieable law. That the land in question was 
owned by Salt Lake County at all times here 
material, except subsequent to December, 1940, 
when it wa.s sold subject to respondent's lease, is 
not controverted by the evidenee. Thi~ gave re .. 
spondent the right to the possession which he had 
'vhen appellant trespassed by plowing and planting. 
R.espondent 's damage was amply pleaded, but even 
if it had not been this objection was waived by 
appellant's failure to object to the introduction of 
evidence. The only real question in the case is the 
possibility of an estoppel against plaintiff's ass.e~rt­
ing the right he acquired from the County, which 
right was supported by a title reeognized by both 
the ap~pellant and the original le~ssor to both par-
tieR. Respondent lost his possession and advised 
his former landlord of that fact, although it was 
already known to the landlord. He then, 'vith the 
former landlord's knowledge, leased fro1n the 
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holder of the t~x title and advised the appellant of 
that fact, althoug·h appellant n1ust have kno,vn it 
already through his inability or lack of desire to 
obtain a renewal of his lease from the County given 
in May, 1938. Here is no denial of a landlord, be-
cause the landlord has himself recognized the re-
'3pondent's lessor by purchasing the land from Salt 
Lake County subject to respondent's lease. Any 
presumption of holding under the former landlord 
is fully dissipated, which respondent is entitled to 
show. 
The judgment of the district court is sound and 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted. 
~[O.YI.JE, RICHARDS & 1\IcKAY, 
AND RICHARD L. BIR,D, JR., 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Respondent. 
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